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PROJECTING THE IMPACT OF LANNING AND RANSOM: 
CALCULATING “PROJECTED DISPOSABLE INCOME” IN 
CHAPTER 13 REPAYMENT PLANS 
Theresa J. Pulley Radwan∗ 
In 2005, Congress amended the United States Bankruptcy Code (the 
“Code”) through the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act (“BAPCPA”).1 In part, these amendments required a formulaic calculation 
of the “projected disposable income” a chapter 13 debtor must pay to 
unsecured creditors, which is based on the debtor’s prebankruptcy income and 
allowed expenditures.2 In consecutive terms, the United States Supreme Court 
 
 ∗ Associate Dean for Administration & Business Affairs and Professor of Law, Stetson University 
College of Law. Prof. Radwan thanks the administration and staff of Stetson University College of Law for 
their support and assistance in this project, and her research assistants, Christian Leger, J.D. 2012, and Juan 
Jose Diaz Granados, LL.M. 2012, for their research and review of this article. 
 1 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. 
 2 Section 102(h) of BAPCPA, entitled “Applicability of Means Test to Chapter 13,” amends § 1325(b) 
of the Code to define “disposable income”—but not “projected disposable income”—to include: 
current monthly income received by the debtor (other than child support payments, foster care 
payments, or disability payments for a dependent child made in accordance with applicable 
nonbankruptcy law to the extent reasonably necessary to be expended for such child) less 
amounts reasonably necessary to be expended— 
(A) (i) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor, or for a 
domestic support obligation, that first becomes payable after the date the petition is 
filed; and 
 (ii) for charitable contributions (that meet the definition of ‘charitable contribution’ 
under section 548(d)(3) to a qualified religious or charitable entity or organization (as 
defined in section 548(d)(4)) in an amount not to exceed 15 percent of gross income of 
the debtor for the year in which the contributions are made; and 
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the 
continuation, preservation, and operation of such business. 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, § 102(h)(1)–(2), 119 Stat. 
23, 33–34. It then goes on to link expenses to the means test of § 707: 
Amounts reasonably necessary to be expended under paragraph (2) shall be determined in 
accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 707(b)(2), if the debtor has current 
monthly income, when multiplied by 12, greater than— 
(A) in the case of a debtor in a household of 1 person, the median family income of the 
applicable State for 1 earner; 
(B) in the case of a debtor in a household of 2, 3, or 4 individuals, the highest median family 
income of the applicable State for a family of the same number or fewer individuals; or 
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considered the effect of changes to a debtor’s income3 and then expenses4 in 
calculating a debtor’s projected disposable income within a chapter 13 
bankruptcy case.5 While the Court answered some questions about the 
calculation of “projected disposable income”—a phrase only partially defined 
by the BAPCPA amendments—the Court’s decisions awakened a debate as to 
how a debtor may claim expenses in calculating projected disposable income 
when, in reality, the debtor incurs only a portion of the allowed expense. In the 
aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decisions, Ransom v. FIA Card Services, 
N.A.6 and Hamilton v. Lanning,7 lower courts have used the opinions to 
support conflicting solutions to this dilemma. 
The conflicting solutions vary based on how courts define expenses. To 
calculate disposable income, which is the funds available to repay creditors, a 
debtor must deduct listed expenses. Throughout the Code, phrases such as 
“reasonably necessary,”8 “actual,”9 and “applicable”10 modify expenses. In 
interpreting these modifiers, two approaches exist for dealing with a debtor 
whose actual expenses differ from the Code’s allowed expenses. The “cap” 
approach limits the debtor’s expense deductions to the lesser of the actual 
amount spent or the standard allowance (as defined by the Code); the 
“allowance” approach permits the debtor to take the entire standard allowance 
deduction regardless of whether the debtor actually incurs all of that 
allowance. Under either approach, if the debtor’s expenses change during the 
three- to five- year term of the repayment plan, courts decide whether to adopt 
a “step-up” approach that limits a debtor’s ability to claim expenses to only the 
time the debtor actually incurs such an expense. The fact that courts have used 
 
(C) in the case of a debtor in a household exceeding 4 individuals, the highest median family 
income of the applicable State for a family of 4 or fewer individuals, plus $525 per month 
for each individual in excess of 4. 
§ 102(h)(3), 119 Stat. 23, 34. 
 3 Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010). 
 4 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011). The Court decided both Ransom and 
Lanning 8–1, with Justice Scalia dissenting. Id. at 730 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Hamilton, 130 S. Ct. at 2478 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 5 BAPCPA modified the less structured definition for “disposable income,” but retained the pre-
BAPCPA requirement that the debtor include all “projected disposable income” for payment to unsecured 
creditors to confirm a chapter 13 plan. Hamilton, 130 S. Ct. at 2469–70. 
 6 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011). 
 7 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010). 
 8 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)–(3) (2006). 
 9 See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
 10 See id. 
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Ransom and Lanning to support a variety of these approaches highlights the 
inherent conflict between the two opinions and creates additional issues for the 
bankruptcy courts. 
This Article considers two issues unresolved by Ransom and Lanning 
encountered in calculating projected disposable income: (1) a debtor’s actual 
expenses are less than the expense allowance, and (2) a debtor’s expense 
terminates during the bankruptcy repayment plan period. After considering the 
language of §§ 707(b) and 1325(b), the decisions in Lanning and Ransom, and 
the policies espoused by BAPCPA, the Article concludes that a debtor should 
only be permitted to deduct the amount of an expense actually used to 
determine projected disposable income devoted to repayment of creditors. 
I. THE ROLE OF PROJECTED DISPOSABLE INCOME IN A CHAPTER 13 
REPAYMENT PLAN 
Chapter 13 allows an individual11 debtor to repay creditors through a plan 
outlining the timing and amount of payment to each creditor.12 Unlike a 
chapter 7 bankruptcy case, in which debtors pay creditor claims from the 
liquidation of prepetition assets,13 chapter 13 focuses primarily on the 
postpetition earnings14 of the debtor to support the repayment plan. A chapter 
13 debtor must propose a plan of repayment within fourteen days of filing the 
bankruptcy petition.15 The court then determines whether to confirm the plan.16 
Upon confirmation of the plan, the debtor pays the trustee who, in turn, pays 
creditors according to the dictates of the repayment plan.17 While the Code 
provides several bases for denying plan confirmation,18 Lanning and Ransom 
 
 11 Id. § 109(e). 
 12 Id. §§ 1322, 1325. 
 13 These prepetition assets become property of the estate upon entry of the order for relief, which in a 
voluntary bankruptcy case occurs upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Id. §§ 301(b), 541(a). 
 14 Debtors electing to file under chapter 13 must have regular income in order to support the repayment 
plan. Id. § 109(e). In a chapter 13 case, earnings during the bankruptcy plan period are also included as 
property of the estate and the debtor maintains possession of these assets except as provided for in the plan. Id. 
§ 1306(a)–(b). 
 15 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b). 
 16 11 U.S.C. §§ 1324, 1325. 
 17 Id. § 1322(a)(1). 
 18 See, e.g., id. § 1322(a) (providing basic plan requirements, including providing sufficient resources to 
fund the plan, payment in full of priority claimants, and fair treatment of claims within a class.); id. § 1325(a) 
(allowing plan confirmation only if it meets a variety of requirements, such as: paying all fees, filing the 
bankruptcy petition and proposing the plan in good faith, paying unsecured claimants at least what the 
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involved denial of confirmation of the plan because the debtors allegedly failed 
to include all “projected disposable income” for the payment of unsecured 
claims.19 
For debtors whose current monthly income20 equals or exceeds the state 
median income,21 the Code defines “disposable income” as the difference 
between the debtor’s current monthly income and a set of defined expenses 
permitted by the Code.22 These expenses fall within the “means test” of 
§ 707(b);23 chapter 13 of the Code incorporates them by reference to the means 
test.24 A court cannot confirm the debtor’s proposed plan in a chapter 13 
bankruptcy case over the objection of a trustee or unsecured creditor if the 
 
claimants would have received in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case, allowing secured claimants to retain the 
security interest, paying secured claimants in full, proposing a feasible plan, paying domestic support 
obligations, and filing tax returns). 
 19 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 724–28 (2011); Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 
2464, 2469 (2010). Interestingly, in Ransom, the Supreme Court never refers to “projected” disposable 
income. Instead, it focuses on how the term “applicable” affects the definition of “disposable income.” 
Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 724–28. However, the Court’s focus on how “[i]n Chapter 13 proceedings, the means 
test provides a formula to calculate a debtor’s disposable income, which the debtor must devote to reimbursing 
creditors under a court-approved plan generally lasting from three to five years” provides the necessary 
reference to “projected” disposable income within a chapter 13 repayment plan. Id. at 721 (citing 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325(b)). 
 20 Current monthly income equals the average of the debtor’s monthly incomes received during the six 
months prior to the month of filing the bankruptcy petition. Id. § 101(10A). 
 21 Debtors whose “current monthly income” annualized exceeds the state median income for a similarly-
sized household must determine necessary support expenses by reference to “means test” data in § 707(b)(2). 
Id. § 1325(b)(3). 
 22 Id. § 1325(b)(2). These allowed expenses include postpetition domestic support obligations, qualified 
charitable deductions, necessary business expenses, and expenses necessary for support of the debtor and his 
or her dependents. Id. 
 23 The means test includes those expenses allowed by the IRS as National or Local Standards; actual, 
reasonable, and necessary expenses for certain family or household members; actual expenses of administering 
the chapter 13 plan; actual, reasonable, and necessary educational expenses up to a designated amount for 
minor children; actual, reasonable, and necessary utility costs in excess of those provided for in the standards; 
and payment to secured and priority claimants. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A). Often debt payments fall in part within the 
standard expenses, and also fall within the actual expense sections of the means test. See, e.g., In re Meek, 370 
B.R. 294, 308–12 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007) (discussing judicial resolutions of potential “double-dipping” 
problem whereby a debtor could deduct certain secured debt under two different means test provisions). For 
example, debt owed to a mortgage lender or holder of a purchase money security interest in an automobile 
would constitute both a allowed expense under the Local Standards and a secured debt under 
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I). Courts considering what deductions to allow in such cases generally held that the debtor 
could deduct the standard allowance in calculating projected disposable income, but had to reduce that 
allowance by the debt payments already deducted as secured debt. In re Meek, 370 B.R. at 311. In essence, the 
debtor who actually incurred a mortgage or automobile expense could deduct the greater of the actual secured 
debt payment or the IRS allowance in calculating projected disposable income. 
 24 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3); see also Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 721 n.1. 
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debtor fails to include all projected disposable income to fund the plan during 
the applicable commitment period.25 But the Code fails to define either 
“projected” or “projected disposable income,” leaving open the question of 
how the term “projected” modifies the formulaic calculation of disposable 
income created by the means test. Fitting §§ 707(b) and 1325(b) together poses 
problems because 
the definition of “disposable income” set forth in § 1325(b)(2) is 
strictly backward-looking in measuring the debtor’s income by virtue 
of its reliance on the statutorily defined concept of “current monthly 
income.” That which the “best efforts” test of § 1325(b)(1) is trying 
to measure (and ensure is going to creditor repayment), though, is the 
forward-looking “projected disposable income to be received during” 
the coming term of the plan.26 
This natural tension between these Code sections and the Code’s policies of 
maximizing creditor repayment,27 minimizing judicial discretion,28 and 
ensuring a fresh start for debtors29 reached the Supreme Court in Lanning and 
Ransom. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT CASES 
A. Hamilton v. Lanning: Changed Income 
Lanning involved a debtor whose income rose above her prebankruptcy 
income due to a single payment from her former employer, termed a “buy-
out,” that would not occur again in the future.30 As a result, the debtor’s current 
monthly income, calculated according to the Code’s definition, exceeded the 
 
 25 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B). The applicable commitment period, in turn, equals three or five years, 
depending upon whether the debtor’s current monthly income exceeds the state’s median monthly income. 
§ 1325(b)(4)(B). 
 26 Ralph Brubaker, Supreme Court Adopts the Forward-Looking Approach to Projected Disposable 
Income in Chapter 13, 30 BANKR. L. LETTER 2, Aug. 2010, available at Westlaw, 30 No. 8 BLL 2. 
 27 Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 721 (noting BAPCPA’s primary purpose of maximizing creditor repayment). 
 28 See Mantas Valiunas, Comment, Anything But Automatic: Dismissal under § 521, 28 EMORY BANKR. 
DEV. J. 231, 237–38 (2011). 
 29 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991); see also Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2473–
74 (2010) (noting that while BAPCPA served to maximize recovery for creditors, that purpose must be read in 
light of the history of the entire Code). 
 30 Hamilton, 130 S. Ct. at 2470. While an employer buy-out may not be a frequent occurrence, other 
types of one-time payments could occur in the employment context, such as bonuses for promotions or 
extraordinary work, or salary adjustments based on equitable considerations. 
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income that she would likely receive during the term of the repayment plan.31 
While the calculation of disposable income, and thus of projected disposable 
income, also includes expenditures, the only dispute in Lanning involved the 
income side of the calculation. In calculating projected disposable income, the 
debtor omitted the buy-out payment, resulting in a lower income and, thus, a 
lower disposable income to be included within the plan’s provisions. The 
trustee argued against confirmation of the debtor’s plan because the debtor 
failed to include all projected disposable income in the plan—here, the buy-out 
was excluded.32 The trustee advocated the mechanical approach, under which 
the debtor must include all disposable income into the plan, calculated using 
the formula provided by §§ 1325 and 707(b), multiplied by the number of 
months of the plan.33 The debtor, arguing for the forward-looking approach, 
asserted that the term “projected” allows for postpetition changes from the 
formulaic calculation of disposable income.34 
The Court rejected the trustee’s suggested method of calculating projected 
disposable income by merely multiplying the disposable income over the term 
of the bankruptcy plan. The Court considered the ordinary meaning of the term 
“projected,” finding that projections include more than simply “assumption[s] 
that the past will necessarily repeat itself.”35 The Court noted that because 
other places within the Code expressly provide for multiplication, “projected” 
must mean something different than simple multiplication.36 The Court also 
looked to language within other sections of the Code, noting that the debtor 
calculates projected disposable income “as of the effective date of the plan”—
 
 31 Id. The calculation of current monthly income and disposable income uses data provided by the debtor 
in Form B22C. The debtor must also file Schedules I and J, indicating the anticipated income and expenses of 
the debtor during the bankruptcy case. STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, OFFICIAL BANKRUPTCY FORM 6I 
(12/07), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_1207/B_006I_ 
1207f.pdf; STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, OFFICIAL BANKRUPTCY FORM 6J (12/07), available at http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_1207/B_006J_1207f.pdf; STATEMENT OF 
FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, OFFICIAL BANKRUPTCY FORM 22C (12/10), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK%20Forms%201210/B_22C_1210.pdf. 
 32 Hamilton, 130 S. Ct. at 2470. 
 33  Id. at 2470–71. 
 34 Id. at 2471. The debtor’s income, if calculated using the forward-looking approach, fell below the state 
median for a similarly-situated household. Id. at 2470. Such an income calculation could lead to other 
consequences, including modifying the debtor’s applicable commitment period for the chapter 13 bankruptcy 
plan under § 1325(b)(4), or allowing the debtor to include all amounts necessary for “maintenance and 
support” rather than using the expenses allowed within §§ 707, 1325(b)(2)(A)(i), and 1325(b)(3)(A). See supra 
Part I; infra Part III.A. 
 35 Hamilton, 130 S. Ct. at 2471. 
 36 Id. at 2472. 
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implying that the income on that effective date might differ from prepetition 
income used for determining projected disposable income.37 Finally, the Court 
considered the history of bankruptcy law and the BAPCPA amendments to 
conclude that Congress intended some flexibility in calculating disposable 
income for the purposes of funding a chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.38 Ultimately, 
the Court held that projected disposable income allowed for “virtually certain” 
changes to income postpetition. However, the Court implied that absent near-
certainty that future income would differ from prepetition “current monthly 
income,” a mechanical calculation is still the starting point for determining 
projected disposable income.39 
B. Ransom v. FIA Card Services: Allowable Expenses 
One year after Lanning, the Court addressed the same issue of whether to 
apply the formulaic approach, but on the expense side of the projected 
disposable income equation. Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A. involved a 
debtor who owned a car outright, but sought to deduct the car ownership 
expense permitted under the Local Standards referred to by § 707(b).40 As it 
did in Lanning, the Court eschewed the formulaic approach in favor of a more 
realistic picture of the debtor’s true situation during the chapter 13 bankruptcy 
plan repayment period. Specifically, the Court denied the debtor the ability to 
deduct anything but car maintenance expenses when the debtor did not make a 
loan or lease payment on the car.41 
In its analysis, the Court first noted that the Code’s Local Standards follow 
the IRS’s Standards42 for taxpayers,43 and that IRS Collection Financial 
 
 37 Id. at 2474. 
 38 See id. at 2472–74 (explaining that pre-BAPCPA cases teach not to erode past bankruptcy practice 
absent a clear congressional intention to do so). 
 39 See id. at 2475 (“As the Tenth Circuit recognized in this case, a court taking the forward-looking 
approach should begin by calculating disposable income, and in most cases, nothing more is required. It is 
only in unusual cases that a court may go further and take into account other known or virtually certain 
information about the debtor’s future income or expenses.”); see also James Davis-Smith, A Consensus 
Emerges on the Projected Disposable Income Test under Lanning: Modified “Disposable Income,” Not Actual 
Ability to Pay, 9 NORTON BANKR. L. ADV. 1, Sept. 2011, at text accompanying notes 1–2 available at 
Westlaw, 2011 NO. 9 NRTN-BLA 1 (“[C]onsensus seems to be emerging . . . that Lanning’s forward-looking 
approach permits only limited adjustments to the ‘disposable income’ calculation on Official Form B22C.”).  
 40 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2011). 
 41 Id. at 725–26. 
 42 See 26 U.S.C. § 7122(d)(2) (2006). 
 43 Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 722 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv)). 
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Standards tie ownership costs to “monthly loan or lease payments.”44 Thus, to 
the extent that the debtor could deduct car ownership expenses, those expenses 
require the debtor to make a monthly payment toward ownership costs. In 
determining whether a debtor who did not incur such an ownership expense 
could nonetheless deduct a car ownership expense, the Court started with the 
language of the Code, noting that only “applicable” expenses fall within the 
means test calculation.45 Because this debtor did not have any expense 
attributable to owning a car, either as a lease or finance payment, the Court 
concluded that such an expense did not apply to this debtor.46 The Court 
emphasized that this conclusion comports with BAPCPA’s intent to maximize 
recovery for creditors in disallowing unnecessary deductions.47 
Consistent with Lanning, Ransom rejects the mechanical (or formulaic) 
approach for calculating disposable income when determining “projected 
disposable income” for a confirmable chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.48 
C. Principles from Lanning & Ransom 
Read together, these decisions suggest that: 
1. The starting point for determining projected disposable income 
involves the calculation of current monthly income based on the six 
 
 44 Id. However, the Court distinguished the use of the Collection Standards for guidance from the 
complete inclusion of the Collection Standards within the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 726 n.7 (“we emphasize 
again that the statute does not ‘incorporat[e]’ or otherwise ‘impor[t]’ the IRS’s guidance. . . . The IRS creates 
the National and Local Standards referenced in the statute, revises them as it deems necessary, and uses them 
every day. The agency might, therefore, have something insightful and persuasive (albeit not controlling) to 
say about them.”). 
 45 Id. at 724 (citing § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)). 
 46 Id. at 725–26. 
 47 Id. at 725. See also Christopher W. Frost, Inching Toward Workability: The Supreme Court Adds to Its 
BAPCPA Jurisprudence, 31 BANKR. L. LETTER 1, Mar. 2011, at notes 25–26 and accompanying text, available 
at Westlaw, 31 No. 3 BLL 1 (“If one understands the use of the means test expenses as an effort to increase 
creditor recoveries, those expenses should be interpreted narrowly.”); Ned W. Waxman, Final Score on 
“Projected Disposable Income”: Forward-Looking Approach (8), Mechanical Approach (1), 48 HOUS. L. 
REV. 315, 348 (2011) (arguing that Lanning correctly applied the forward-looking approach in reaching 
BAPCPA’s “goals of preventing bankruptcy abuse, making certain that debtors repay creditors the most that 
they can afford, and shifting can-pay debtors from a Chapter 7 liquidation to a Chapter 13 repayment plan.”). 
 48 Frost, supra note 47, at text accompanying notes 25–26 (“it seems as though the Court may be moving 
toward a general understanding of the means test and the test for projected disposable income that incorporates 
a significant dose of reality into what may appear to be fairly mechanical tests.”). 
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months preceding the petition date, reduced by the expenses permitted 
under § 707(b).49 
2. A debtor who does not incur any expense in a category may not deduct 
that expense.50 
3. Known or virtually certain changes from the calculation of disposable 
income under § 707(b) may be accounted for in projecting the 
disposable income for the term of the plan.51 
The Court used the Code’s language to develop each of these three principles. 
While the cases combined suggest an approach that lends weight to the 
debtor’s economic realities, the Court refused to abandon the formulaic 
approach altogether. Instead, the Court attempted to balance the Code’s 
formula with a more realistic assessment of a debtor’s financial situation. This 
balancing of the congressional intent to create clear rules and reverence to 
bankruptcy policies left bankruptcy courts with several unresolved issues.52 
III.  THE DEBTOR’S ABILITY TO CLAIM THE STANDARD DEDUCTION IF THE 
STANDARD DEDUCTION EXCEEDS ACTUAL EXPENSE OR ACTUAL EXPENSE 
TERMINATES BEFORE THE END OF THE CHAPTER 13 PLAN PERIOD 
The issue of whether a debtor may claim a full deduction under the IRS 
National and Local Standards when the debtor incurs an actual expense, but 
not the full deduction, arises in two situations. In the first situation, assume that 
the Standards grant a debtor a $200 monthly automobile ownership expense 
deduction pursuant to § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).53 If the debtor actually pays only 
$180 per month in loan repayment, may the debtor take the full $200 monthly 
deduction, or only the $180 actually used? In the other situation, if the debtor 
does actually spend $200 per month on a loan payment, but that payment will 
end one year into the chapter 13 plan period, can the debtor take the deduction 
for the entire length of the bankruptcy plan, or must the disposable income 
change upon payment in full of the car loan? 
 
 49 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 50 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 51 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 52 See Frost, supra note 47, at text accompanying notes 47–49 (noting the inherent problem of 
BAPCPA’s competing purposes of maximizing creditor recovery and minimizing judicial discretion). 
 53 Throughout this Article, references to “§ 707(b)(2),” “allowances,” or the “standard deductions” refer 
to § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)’s deductions. 
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Ransom, referring to the IRS’s standards, noted that the ownership expense 
deduction reflects the cost of financing the automobile, either through loan or 
lease payments.54 The Ransom Court rejected taking a deduction for a non-
existent expense in calculating projected disposable income. However, the 
Court declined to determine whether debtors who make some payment toward 
a car lease or loan may take the entire standard expense for the entire length of 
the plan or must take only the actual amount of the monthly payment for the 
actual period in which the debtors make payments in calculating projected 
disposable income. 
A. Forms Versus Schedules 
Upon petitioning for bankruptcy protection, the debtor completes Form 
B22C, which includes a calculation of current monthly income based on the six 
months preceding the bankruptcy filing date.55 Prior to the enactment of 
BAPCPA and its means test, Schedules I and J56 guided the calculation of 
projected disposable income.57 These schedules list the debtor’s anticipated 
future income and expenditures, respectively.58 Since BAPCPA, the language 
of §§ 1325(b) and 707(b)(2) requires calculating disposable income by taking 
the information from Form B22C and deducting standard expenses, with little 
need to consider the information on Schedules I and J. However, the Lanning 
and Ransom decisions suggest that the information on Schedules I and J still 
plays a role in determining projected disposable income for chapter 13 plan 
confirmation. Furthermore, courts continue to respect bankruptcy practices 
prior to enactment of BAPCPA, absent a clear intent to modify those 
practices.59 
 
 54 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 725 (2011). 
 55 STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, OFFICIAL BANKRUPTCY FORM 22C (12/10), available at http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK%20Forms%201210/B_22C_1210.pdf. 
 56 STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, OFFICIAL BANKRUPTCY FORM 6I (12/07), available at http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_1207/B_006I_1207f.pdf; STATEMENT OF 
FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, OFFICIAL BANKRUPTCY FORM 6J (12/07), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_1207/B_006J_1207f.pdf 
 57 In re Egbert, 384 B.R. 818, 823 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2008). 
 58 A debtor also provides other financial information including recent tax returns. 11 U.S.C. § 521(e)–(j) 
(2006). 
 59 Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2473 (2010) (“Pre-BAPCPA bankruptcy practice is telling 
because we ‘will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that 
Congress intended such a departure.’”) (quoting Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 
443 (2007); Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004); Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998)). 
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In one instance, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon relied on 
Lanning to reject a purely mechanical test based on Bankruptcy Form B22C 
and allowed debtors to use evidence, including, but not limited to, Schedules I 
and J, to modify the mechanical calculation.60 In In re Reed, the debtors 
proposed a forty-three-month chapter 13 plan.61 The debtors in this case 
needed to calculate one component of disposable income—the current monthly 
income—to determine whether they could propose and confirm a plan of less 
than sixty months.62 Using Form B22C, the debtors’ current monthly income 
would not require a sixty-month plan, but if Schedules I and J controlled, the 
debtors’ current monthly income required a sixty-month plan.63 The court 
 
 60 In re Reed, 454 B.R. 790 (Bankr. D. Or. 2011). 
 61 Id. at 796. 
 62 Id. A debtor whose current monthly income (not projected disposable income) equals or exceeds the 
state median income for a similarly-situated household must propose a sixty-month plan. § 1325(b)(3)–(4). 
However, a circuit split exists regarding the length of the plan for a debtor whose current monthly income 
exceeds the state median, but who has no projected disposable income to pay to unsecured creditors. Compare 
Whaley v. Tennyson (In re Tennyson), 611 F.3d 873 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that the applicable commitment 
period is inconsequential when disposable income is negative), with Baud v. Carroll, 43 F.3d 327 (6th Cir. 
2011) (concluding that the debtor must propose a sixty-month plan despite the lack of projected disposable 
income), and Timothy v. Anderson (In re Timothy), 442 B.R. 28 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2010) (same). See also 
Maney v. Kagenveama (In re Kagenveama), 541 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2008) (pre-Lanning case using the 
“multiplier” approach to determine that a debtor with no projected disposable income need not propose a five-
year plan of repayment if secured and priority claims can be paid in shorter time period). While the Court in 
Lanning criticized Kagenveama, Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2475, courts continue to consider what impact 
Kagenveama has in determining how to calculate projected disposable income. See Danielson v. Flores (In re 
Flores), 692 F.3d 1021, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2012) (deciding that Lanning did not overrule Kagenveama, on the 
issue of determining applicable commitment period); In re Henderson, 455 B.R. 203, 208 (Bankr. D. Idaho 
2011) (“Because the Supreme Court adopted the forward-looking approach, as opposed to the Kagenveama 
favored mechanical approach, Kagenveama’s instructions to bankruptcy courts for calculating debtors’ 
projected disposable income were effectively overruled. But, contrary to Trustee’s suggestion, it is clear the 
Lanning decision did not directly address the other issue resolved in Kagenveama: whether § 1325(b)(1)(B) 
requires an above-median-income debtor with no projected disposable income to make payments to debtors 
over the applicable commitment period.”). 
 63 In re Reed, 454 B.R. at 794. Reed involved the calculation of disposable income, in the context of 
determining the “applicable commitment period” for a chapter 13 bankruptcy. The Reed court recognized that 
“[t]he questions of how to project disposable income and what ‘applicable commitment period’ is used when 
an above-median debtor has zero or negative projected disposable income have vexed debtors, trustees, and the 
courts since amendment of the statutory definition of ‘disposable income.’” Id. at 795. To the extent that the 
debtor has projected disposable income in excess of the state median for a similarly situated household, the 
debtor has a five-year “applicable commitment period”—thus requiring the debtor to have a sixty-month-long 
repayment plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4)(A)(ii). A debtor whose projected disposable income is less than the 
state median does not face the same requirement. Id. § 1325(b)(4)(A)(i). The debtors in Reed sought to 
establish a projected disposable income of less than the state median, which would in turn allow them the 
shorter repayment plan; the trustee argued that the debtors’ income exceeded the state median and, thus, their 
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rejected a purely mechanical test based upon Form B22C, but did not see the 
schedules as the only other option.64 Rather, the court noted that Form B22C 
remains the starting point for determining current monthly income. The party 
wishing to modify that calculation65 bears the burden of showing that such a 
calculation fails to reflect the debtor’s postpetition financial situation. 
Schedules I and J may rebut the presumptions of the formulaic approach, but 
the schedules are “not sufficient alone to allow deviation from the Form B22C 
disposable income in calculating projected disposable income.”66 The party 
seeking to modify the calculation must show, per Lanning, certainty of those 
changes regardless of what the schedules anticipate as future income or 
expenses.67 As the Reed court noted, this approach creates a burden-shift, 
rather than a bright line rule that focuses entirely on the Schedules I and J or 
Form B22C.68 Such a burden-shifting approach ensures that the standard 
deductions provide the starting point for determining projected disposable 
income. It also allows parties to demonstrate a need for modification when the 
Standard Expenses do not apply because a debtor does not incur any expense 
in a category, or when the income or actual expenditures change in such a way 
that the Form B22C does not accurately reflect the debtor’s financial situation. 
It also furthers the policy of limiting judicial discretion only to those situations 
in which a debtor or trustee can demonstrate a need to vary the income or 
actual expenditures—balancing creditor recovery and debtor fresh start. 
 
forty-three-month plan of repayment failed to meet the Code requirements for the length of the plan. In re 
Reed, 454 B.R. at 795. 
 64 Id. at 796–97. 
 65 While in Reed the trustee sought to use Schedules I and J to calculate projected disposable income and 
the debtor sought to use the form and standard allowances for the calculation, the parties seeking to modify the 
form with the schedules might flip in other situations. Id. at 795. For an example of a situation in which the 
debtor sought to use the schedules to reduce projected disposable income because the Form B22C income 
included artificially inflated figures for income, see Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2471 (2010). For an 
example of a situation which would rebut the presumption of the form/standard approach, focusing particularly 
on Lanning-type examples, see In re Reed, 454 B.R. at 797. 
 66 Id. at 797–98. 
 67  Id. at 798. 
 68 Id. at 796–97. The court explained how the burden will shift between the parties in making a 
determination of projected disposable income: 
When the trustee seeks to rebut the presumption that the monthly disposable income shown in the 
Form B22C accurately reflects a debtor’s projected disposable income, the trustee bears the 
initial burden to present evidence that the amounts used in the form do not adequately predict the 
debtor’s disposable income into the future. . . . However, once the trustee makes an initial 
showing, debtors as proponents of the plan have the burden to show that the plan complies with 
all of the requirements for confirmation. Id. at 796. 
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B. Statutory Language 
Sections 1325(b) and 707(b)(2) provide the parameters for determining a 
debtor’s disposable income in a chapter 13 bankruptcy case. Combining these 
sections, disposable income equals current monthly income minus the debtor’s 
reasonably necessary expenses, which “shall” include applicable national and 
local standards and other actual and necessary expenses.69 
Section 707(b)(2) of the Code provides:  
The debtor’s monthly expenses shall be the debtor’s applicable 
monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and 
Local Standards, and the debtor’s actual monthly expenses for the 
 
 69 Section 1325(b) mandates that: 
(b)(1) If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the 
plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as of the effective date of the plan— 
(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not 
less than the amount of such claim; or 
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor’s projected disposable income to be received in 
the applicable commitment period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under 
the plan will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan. 
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term “disposable income” means current monthly income 
received by the debtor (other than child support payments, foster care payments, or disability 
payments for a dependent child made in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law to the 
extent reasonably necessary to be expended for such child) less amounts reasonably necessary to 
be expended— 
(A)   (i) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor, or for a 
domestic support obligation, that first becomes payable after the date the petition is filed; 
and 
    (ii) for charitable contributions (that meet the definition of “charitable contribution” under 
section 548(d)(3)) to a qualified religious or charitable entity or organization (as defined in 
section 548(d)(4)) in an amount not to exceed 15 percent of gross income of the debtor for 
the year in which the contributions are made; and 
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the 
continuation, preservation, and operation of such business. 
(3) Amounts reasonably necessary to be expended under paragraph (2), other than subparagraph 
(A)(ii) of paragraph (2), shall be determined in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of 
section 707(b)(2), if the debtor has current monthly income, when multiplied by 12, greater than- 
(A) in the case of a debtor in a household of 1 person, the median family income of the 
applicable State for 1 earner; 
(B) in the case of a debtor in a household of 2, 3, or 4 individuals, the highest median family 
income of the applicable State for a family of the same number or fewer individuals; or 
(C) in the case of a debtor in a household exceeding 4 individuals, the highest median family 
income of the applicable State for a family of 4 or fewer individuals, plus $625 per month 
for each individual in excess of 4. 
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)–(3) (2006) (footnote omitted). 
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categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the 
Internal Revenue Service for the area in which the debtor 
resides . . . .70 
While Ransom helps tailor the definition of disposable income by noting that 
“applicable” refers to an expense that the debtor actually has incurred,71 there 
remains uncertainty in defining the parameters of the disposable income of a 
debtor who incurs some expense, but not the full National or Local Standard 
expense amount for the length of the plan. As Ransom noted, the term 
“applicable” does not itself mean “actual.”72 But can the Ransom holding be 
extended to mean that the modifiers “reasonable” and “necessary” indicate that 
the debtor cannot deduct more than the debtor actually uses? Or does the term 
“shall” indicate that the debtor may use the entire amount of the allowance as a 
deduction? 
C. The Allowance Approach 
Courts that adopt the allowance approach permit the debtor to deduct the 
full amount of any standard deduction, even if the debtor actually spends less 
than the allowed expense. In the consolidated case, In re Scott, the Bankruptcy 
Court for the Southern District of Illinois allowed debtors to deduct the entire 
allowance despite actually incurring less than the allowance. The Scott court 
allowed the debtors to deduct the full amount of the automobile expenses 
permitted by the Local Standards even though the debtors actually spent less 
than the allowance amounts.73 In its analysis, the court focused on statutory 
construction. In particular, the court noted that § 707(b) divided means test 
deductions into “actual” expenses and “standard” deductions. Because the 
automobile expenses fell within the standard deductions of the means test, 
whether the debtor actually uses the entire expense does not matter.74 In so 
deciding, the court found that neither Lanning nor Ransom interpreted the 
Code in a way that changed this analysis.75 Ransom deemed a car expense 
inappropriate on the basis that a debtor who incurs no expense does not have 
an applicable expense. The Ransom Court declined to extend the term 
 
 70 Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (emphasis added). 
 71 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2011). 
 72 Id. at 727. 
 73 In re Scott, 457 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2011). 
 74 Id. at 746. 
 75 Id. at 746, 748 (citing In re Barrett, 371 B.R. 855 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2007)). 
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“applicable” to modify the amount of the allowance for a debtor who incurs an 
applicable expense in the category.76 
The Scott court’s approach follows the canon of statutory construction that 
requires meaning be given to every word within a statute.77 The Supreme Court 
used the same canon of construction in Ransom, when it considered the use of 
the term “applicable” versus “actual.”78 If Congress intended § 707(b) to limit 
a debtor to using only the amount of the expense that the debtor actually 
incurred, such expenses would fall within the actual expenses79 rather than in 
the applicable standard expenses. Although the Scott court did not consider 
Ransom as determinative in making its decision, Scott comports with Ransom 
because Ransom was decided based on the term “applicable.”80 Combining the 
Ransom and Scott courts’ analyses of statutory construction, “applicable” 
refers to whether the debtor incurs an expense, and “actual” refers to the 
amount of the expense used by the debtor. Thus, the statutory construction of 
§ 707(b)(2) suggests that as long as a debtor incurs an expense in the standard 
expense category, the debtor can deduct the entire standard expense in 
calculating disposable income. 
While the Scott court determined that Ransom did not address the issue 
before the court,81 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico reached 
the same conclusion as Scott, but found that Ransom dictated such a result.82 In 
In re Miranda, the debtor did not include annual Christmas bonuses in 
calculating income.83 The debtor also deducted all standard expenses in 
 
 76 See Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 724; infra text accompanying notes 104–06. 
 77 3A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 70:6 (7th 
ed. 2008) (citing In re Tennyson, 611 F.3d 873 (11th Cir. 2010); In re Ennis, 558 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 2009); In 
re Kagenveama, 541 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2008); Miller v. U.S., 363 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2004); Schlossberg v. 
Barney, 380 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2004)). 
 78 Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 724. 
 79 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II)–(IV) (2006) (allowing actual expense deductions for medical care, 
administration of the estate, and educational expenses). Each of the actual expense provisions notes that the 
deductible expenses may include actual expenditures for the appropriate category. The standard deductions 
include different language, stating that “[t]he debtor’s monthly expenses shall be the debtor’s applicable 
monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor’s actual 
monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue 
Service for the area in which the debtor resides.”). Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (emphasis added). 
 80 Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 724. 
 81 In re Scott, 457 B.R. at 746. 
 82 In re Miranda, 449 B.R. 182, 191–93 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2011). 
 83 The debtors received annual Christmas bonuses of approximately $2,000 per year, but argued that the 
bonuses were not part of income during the six months prior to the bankruptcy filing date. Id. at 186–87. 
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calculating projected disposable income, even though the debtor’s actual 
expenses were less than the standard expense allowance.84 Citing Lanning, the 
court held that the debtor must include Christmas bonuses that the debtor 
would likely receive during the chapter 13 commitment period because such 
bonuses were virtually certain based on the debtor’s past experience.85 But 
while the facts clearly fit within the Lanning precedent on the income side, the 
facts did not mirror the Ransom facts on the expense side. Nevertheless, the 
court allowed the standard deduction of expenses beyond the debtor’s actual 
expenses, citing Ransom and other cases in noting that Congress passed 
BAPCPA in part to ensure “uniform application of a bright-line test, which 
was more important than accuracy and which limited judicial discretion.”86 
Both the Miranda and Scott courts adopted an allowance approach for 
standard deductions. While the Miranda court did so based on Ransom, the 
Scott court chose a statutory construction approach that consistently read 
§ 707(b)(2) with the Ransom court’s reading of it. 
D. The Cap Approach 
Courts that adopt the cap approach limit the debtor’s deductions to the 
lesser of the standard deduction and the actual expense incurred by the debtor. 
While the Scott court focused on the statutory distinction between actual and 
standard expenses,87 another court’s focus on § 1325(b)’s requirement of 
“reasonably necessary” expenses led it to adopt the cap approach. In re 
McGillis88 preceded Lanning and Ransom, but neither of these Supreme Court 
decisions disturb its reasoning. In McGillis, the debtor’s calculation of 
projected disposable income based on § 707(b)’s allowed deductions netted 
just $140 per month of disposable income; using the debtor’s actual expenses 
 
Because the debtors filed for bankruptcy in January and had presumably received the latest bonus in the six 
months prior to the petition date, the court noted that the bonus should have been included under a mechanical 
approach calculation of projected disposable income. Id. The court then noted that even if the bonus had not 
actually been received in the six months prepetition, the debtors still would have been required to include it in 
their projected disposable income calculation. Id. at 190. 
 84 Id. at 185. 
 85 Id. at 190. 
 86 Id. at 191–92, 194. 
 87 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (2006) (“the debtor’s monthly expenses may include, if 
applicable, the continuation of actual expenses paid by the debtor that are reasonable and necessary for care 
and support” of certain relatives and household members). 
 88 In re McGillis, 370 B.R. 720 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2007). 
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increased projected disposable income to over $1,500 per month.89 In its 
analysis of the phrase “reasonably necessary,” the court noted that the only 
addition that Congress made was to require that the necessity “be determined 
in accordance with . . . section 707(b)(2).”90 The McGillis court concluded that 
the reference to § 707(b)(2) merely provided guidance as to which expenses 
constitute “reasonably necessary” expenses, not to the amounts that fall within 
the categories of reasonable and necessary.91 After determining which 
expenses qualify as reasonably necessary expenses, the amount of those 
expenses is determined not by the statute, but by the actual use of those 
expenses. If the debtor’s actual use exceeds the allowance, only the allowance 
amount qualifies as a reasonably necessary expense. But if the actual use is 
less than the allowance, only the amount actually used is reasonably necessary 
for the debtor.92 
E. Limitations of Plain Meaning 
Three different courts interpreted the same language of the Code—two 
post-Ransom and one pre-Ransom—to reach very different conclusions.93 The 
Miranda court’s express reliance on Ransom to support the allowance 
approach is misguided because the Ransom Court looked at the definition of 
the term “applicable” and found that it referred only to: 
an expense [that] is appropriate, relevant, suitable, or fit. . . . A debtor 
may claim a deduction from a National or Local Standard 
table . . . only if that deduction is appropriate for him. And a 
deduction is so appropriate only if the debtor has costs corresponding 
to the category covered by the table—that is, only if the debtor will 
incur that kind of expense during the life of the plan.94 
Nowhere in that language does the Court discuss the amount of the deduction, 
except when the amount actually used is zero. 
 
 89 Id. at 727. While part of the difference came from allowances exceeding actual expenses, some of the 
difference was also attributable to debts that existed prepetition but would receive no distribution in a chapter 
13 bankruptcy case. Id. 
 90 Id. at 729 (emphasis added). 
 91 See id. 
 92 Id. at 730. 
 93 See In re Scott, 457 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2011); In re Miranda, 449 B.R. 182 (Bankr. D.P.R. 
2011); In re McGillis, 370 B.R. 720; supra Parts III.C.–D. 
 94 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2011). 
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The Scott and McGillis opinions highlight the difficulty of a plain 
interpretation of §§ 1325(b) and 707(b)(2). The McGillis decision interprets 
“reasonably necessary” to include a requirement of “actual” expenses.95 As the 
Scott court noted, however, including the requirement of actual expenses takes 
meaning away from the term “actual” used in other sections of the Code. To 
the extent that Congress wrote part of the statute to reflect a particular idea, 
Congress would have used the same language to reach the same result 
elsewhere in the statute.96 In the very section referred to in determining the 
allowed deductions—§ 707(b)—Congress referred to several expenses in 
which the debtor may take the lesser of a stated cap and the debtor’s actual 
expenses. This suggests that if Congress intended such an interpretation of the 
standard expense allowances in § 707(b)(2), Congress would have used the 
same language to effectuate that intent.97 
Scott correctly noted that interpreting § 707(b)(2)’s language to include an 
actual expenditure requirement for standard expenses would negate the 
meaning of the term “actual” elsewhere in that specific Code section.98 Further, 
§ 707(b)(2)’s use of mandatory language suggests that, after determining the 
applicable and actual expenses, those expenses shall be the debtor’s expenses 
for purposes of the means test.99 The term “shall” connotes a requirement of 
use.100 But the Scott approach fails to consider that the limitation on use of the 
full deductions when a debtor actually expends less than the deduction comes 
not from § 707(b)(2), but instead from § 1325’s “reasonably necessary” 
 
 95 In re McGillis, 370 B.R. at 730.  
 96 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 77, § 46.6 (“courts do not construe different terms within a statute to 
embody the same meaning”). 
 97 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) (2006) (“the debtor’s monthly expenses may include the 
actual expenses for each dependent child less than 18 years of age, not to exceed $1,775 per year per child, to 
attend a private or public elementary or secondary school if the debtor provides documentation of such 
expenses and a detailed explanation of why such expenses are reasonable and necessary, and why such 
expenses are not already accounted for in the National Standards, Local Standards, or Other Necessary 
Expenses”) (footnote omitted). 
 98 In re Scott, 547 B.R. at 745. 
 99 Id.  
 100 See In re Owens, 221 B.R. 199, 200–01 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1998) (noting that while the term “shall” 
generally connotes a requirement, the court may utilize its equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105 to waive 
such a requirement when the requirement fails to further the goals of the Code). The court agreed with the 
debtor’s argument that an exception to the requirement that a debtor attend a creditor’s meeting could be 
justified in some cases, but determined that this particular debtor’s need to care for an ill family member did 
not warrant such an exception. See id. at 201. 
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limitation on a debtor’s expenditures in calculating projected disposable 
income. 
The phrase “reasonably necessary” differs from the term “actual,” 
explaining why Congress would use different terms in different contexts. A 
debtor can actually incur unreasonable or unnecessary expenses. Because the 
amount of an expense never actually incurred cannot constitute a necessary 
expense, the term “reasonably necessary” subsumes the word “actual.” But the 
use of the broader term “reasonably necessary” in § 1325(b) does not render 
the use of the more narrow term “actual” in § 707(b)(2) superfluous in all 
situations because § 707(b)(2) applies to chapter 7 cases where § 1325(b)’s 
“reasonably necessary” qualification will not apply.101 
With clear statutory language, interpreting the statute requires nothing more 
than applying that clear language.102 But when there is an ambiguous statute, 
clear language that contravenes clear legislative intent, or clear language that 
creates an absurd result, courts may consider extrinsic evidence in determining 
the meaning of the statutory language.103 To be considered ambiguous, the 
language of the statute must support two or more reasonable interpretations.104 
The terms “reasonably necessary,” “shall,” “applicable,” and “actual” create 
sufficient ambiguity in interpreting §§ 707(b) and 1325(b) because they 
 
 101 11 U.S.C. § 103(a), (b), (i) (providing that provisions of chapter 7 apply only to cases filed under 
chapter 7 absent an express indication otherwise, and that provisions of chapter 13 apply only to cases filed 
under chapter 13). An individual debtor seeking to file a chapter 7 case must meet the means test standard. 
Because the means test does not itself include a “reasonably necessary” requirement for all expenses, 
removing the word “actual” from § 707(b) might allow a debtor subject to the means test to deduct several 
expenses the debtor never actually incurs. See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (“debtor’s monthly expenses shall be 
the debtor’s applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards, 
and the debtor’s actual monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by 
the Internal Revenue Service for the area in which the debtor resides”) (emphasis added); id. 
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(III) (“the debtor’s monthly expenses may include the actual administrative expenses of 
administering a chapter 13 plan for the district in which the debtor resides, up to an amount of 10 percent of 
the projected plan payments”) (emphasis added); id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) (“the debtor’s monthly expenses 
may include the actual expenses for each dependent child less than 18 years of age, not to exceed $1,775 per 
year per child, to attend a private or public elementary or secondary school”) (emphasis added); id. 
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(V) (“the debtor’s monthly expenses may include an allowance for housing and utilities, in 
excess of the allowance specified by the Local Standards for housing and utilities issued by the Internal 
Revenue Service, based on the actual expenses for home energy costs”) (emphasis added). 
 102 Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (explaining that when the words of a statute 
are unambiguous, the cardinal canon requires a court begin by examining the language of the statute and that is 
also the last step of judicial inquiry); 2A SUTHERLAND supra note 77, § 46.1. 
 103 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 77, § 45.2. 
 104 Id.  
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provide several alternative and reasonable interpretations of apparently 
contradictory language. Thus, courts can consider extrinsic sources of guidance 
in assigning meaning to these provisions. 
F. The Precedential Impact of Lanning & Ransom on Deductible Expense 
Calculation 
1. Debtors Whose Expenses End During the Bankruptcy Plan Period 
In dicta, the Ransom Court noted that its ruling might allow a “troubling 
anomaly” where a debtor could take the full ownership deduction for the entire 
length of the bankruptcy plan by simply having a few car payments remaining 
at the time of confirmation.105 But the Court allowed such an anomaly because 
“Congress chose to tolerate the occasional peculiarity that a brighter-line test 
produces.”106 This language suggests that if the Court had decided the issue, it 
would have allowed the full standard deduction for the entire length of the 
plan, even if the debtor did not actually make payments toward ownership of 
the vehicle during the full length of the plan.107 The policy of maximizing 
creditor recovery promoted by both the Lanning and Ransom decisions and the 
realistic approach that both cases use suggest that a debtor should only deduct 
expenses for the time period that the expenses will actually be incurred by the 
debtor. 
In 2012, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Hawaii considered 
whether joint debtors in a chapter 13 case needed to step-up their disposable 
income upon payment in full of an automobile expense.108 The court, held that 
 
 105 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs. N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 729 (2011). 
 106 Id. Unfortunately, this opinion also leads to some ethical quandaries for a debtor’s counsel. As one 
observer noted, “[t]he advice that most easily flows from the lips of debtor’s attorneys is this: Go buy a new or 
used vehicle prior to filing. If the debtor has an older vehicle, it is better to buy the vehicle now when the 
debtor is more likely to be approved for credit and may receive a more favorable interest rate to boot.” Brian 
Rookard, Vehicle Planning Decision Challenges After Ransom and Lanning, 30 AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 
2011, at 72, 72. Such advice violates the spirit of BAPCPA, which added a provision prohibiting debtor’s 
counsel from advising a client to incur additional debt on the eve of a bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) 
(prohibiting “debt relief agency” from advising client “to incur more debt in contemplation of such person 
filing a [bankruptcy] case”); see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 
1332 (holding that attorneys qualify as debt relief agencies). 
 107 By contrast, some commentators suggest that Ransom will lead courts to follow the minority approach 
of “capping” a debtor’s expenses at the lesser of the allowance or the actual expense based on the realistic 
approach rather than on the Court’s dicta. WILLIAM C. HILLMAN & MARGARET M. CROUCH, PRACTISING LAW 
INSTITUTE: PLI BANKRUPTCY DESKBOOK § 13:3.4 (4th ed. 2007 & Supp. 2012). 
 108 In re Montiho, 466 B.R. 539 (Bankr. D. Haw. 2012). 
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an expense lacks applicability after a debtor makes the final car payment, 
guided by Ransom’s reliance upon applicable expenses.109 The court also 
considered Lanning, noting that the debtor should account for substantially 
certain changes in a chapter 13 repayment plan and the calculation of 
disposable income.110 
The issue of step-up in disposable income upon satisfaction of a prepetition 
obligation exists outside of the automobile repayment scenario, and existed 
prior to the Lanning decision. Several courts have considered the issue in the 
context of calculating projected disposable income when a debtor completes 
repayments on a 401(k) loan and have determined that once a debtor completes 
repayment of a 401(k) loan, the debtor must step up disposable income and 
resulting payments to other creditors under the plan, due to the debtor’s 
foreseeable increase in disposable income.111 
Despite the Ransom Court’s dicta indicating that Congress envisioned 
allowing a debtor to take the full car ownership deduction during the entire 
plan term, even if a peculiar result arose, courts addressing the issue should 
hold that a debtor cannot take the car ownership deduction once the debtor 
completes payments on the actual ownership expense.112 To hold otherwise 
 
 109 Id. at 541–42 (citing Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 728). 
 110 Id. The court rejected the debtors’ argument for modification of the plan as a more appropriate option, 
but did not altogether foreclose the option for debtors who would pay the automobile ownership expense for a 
substantial portion of the plan period. Id. at 541 (stating a three month maturity on an auto loan is not enough). 
Prior to Lanning, courts adopted a more mechanical approach to calculating projected disposable income and 
denied step up payments. See e.g., In re Williams, 394 B.R. 550 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008) (utilizing the 
mechanical approach to calculating projected disposable income prior to Lanning, and thus denying any need 
to step up payments following repayment of secured car debt); In re McLain, 378 B.R. 39 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 
2007) (same); In re Charles, 375 B.R. 338 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007) (same); In re Barrett, 371 B.R. 855 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ill. 2007) (same); see also In re Hughey, 380 B.R. 102 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (denying requirement of 
step-up, but expressly rejecting the mechanical calculation used by other courts). 
 111 Burden v. Seafort (In re Seafort), 437 B.R. 204, 211–13 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2010) (citing Hamilton v. 
Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010)); see also In re Nowlin, 576 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 2009); McCarthy v. Lasowski 
(In re Lasowski), 575 F.3d 815, 817–19 (8th Cir. 2009). Several bankruptcy courts require step-up plans by 
debtors who complete repayments on 401(k) loans. See, e.g., In re Brann, 457 B.R. 738, 739 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 
2011); In re McCullers, 451 B.R. 498, 501–02 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2011); In re Cleaver, 426 B.R. 390 (Bankr. 
D.N.M. 2010). Such loans can present other unique issues involving the definition of property of the estate and 
the protection of retirement funds. See, e.g., In re Egan, 458 B.R. 836, 849–50 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011) (noting 
the conflicting BAPCPA policies of maximizing creditor recovery and protecting debtor’s retirement 
contributions in rejecting trustee’s argument that failure to increase plan payments after repayment to 401(k) 
plan in order to increase contributions to plan constitutes bad faith). 
 112 The termination of the car payments and the resulting increase in projected disposable income could be 
reflected in the plan at confirmation or, potentially, as a modification to the already confirmed repayment plan. 
However, at least one circuit court determined that modification of a confirmed plan requires a “substantial 
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would contravene the Lanning ruling that allows modifications to the 
disposable income calculation to the extent that those modifications involve 
substantially certain changes to the calculation. While the Ransom Court did 
not specifically so hold, the Court focused on the term “applicable” in 
determining the meaning of “disposable income”—a concept measured as of 
the petition date.113 But the meaning of “disposable income” does not present 
an issue when the debtor actually has a car ownership payment at 
commencement of the plan because the disposable income as calculated by the 
Ransom Court accurately reflected the debtor’s reality as of the petition and 
confirmation dates. 
The meaning of “projected” and how that term affects the calculation of 
disposable income presents the real issue in the 401(k) loan payoff scenario. 
Because the term “projected” modifies “disposable income,” not just 
“income,”114 and disposable income includes both income and expenses,115 
Lanning’s interpretation allowing for modifications to the calculation of 
disposable income based on substantially certain changes during the plan term 
applies equally to changes in expenses and income. Few changes are as 
substantially certain as the termination of loan payments pursuant to a contract 
between the debtor and the lender. Thus, just as the income in Lanning would 
certainly decline during the plan period, the car ownership expense will 
certainly terminate during the bankruptcy plan and debtors must account for 
these changes under that analysis. 
Modifying the calculation of disposable income to reflect the termination of 
payments complies with Ransom’s precedent. The Ransom Court’s holding 
focused on applicable expenses and noted a debtor who is not actually paying 
toward the ownership of the vehicle uses no applicable ownership expense.116 
 
and unanticipated change” in the debtor’s circumstances, because to modify on the basis of known variances 
violates principles of res judicata. Murphy v. O’Donnell (In re Murphy), 474 F.3d 143, 150 (4th Cir. 2007). 
Thus, trustees in the Fourth Circuit cannot seek a modification to reflect greater disposable income when car 
payments terminated because the end of the car payments would be anticipated prior to confirmation. But see 
In re Matson, 468 B.R. 361, 368 (9th Cir. 2012) (each determining that modification does not require 
unanticipated changes); Meza v. Truman (In re Meza), 467 F.3d 874 (5th Cir. 2006) (same); Barbosa v. 
Soloman, 235 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2000) (same); In re Witkowski, 16 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); Ledford v. 
Brown (In re Brown), 219 B.R. 191 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998) (same); In re Than, 215 B.R. 430 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
1997) (same). 
 113 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (noting that Ransom never uses term “projected”). 
 114 Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2479 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 115 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2006). 
 116 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 724–26 (2011). 
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“Applicable” expenses as of the petition date, included in the disposable 
income calculation, may change during the term of the bankruptcy plan. To 
determine applicability only as of the date of the bankruptcy petition would 
return to the formulaic, multiplier-based approach that the Court rejected in 
both Lanning and Ransom because it would take the situation as of that date 
and simply allow it to continue throughout the term of the plan unchanged. 
Allowing modification of projected disposable income to account for 
substantially certain changes also addresses the concern of a debtor who paid 
for a car in full prepetition but needs to purchase a new automobile during the 
bankruptcy plan.117 If the need for a new car appears with a strong degree of 
certainty as of the confirmation date, payments on that new car fall within the 
virtually certain changes under the Lanning analysis.118 To the extent that no 
such certainty exists, modification of the chapter 13 plan to account for post 
confirmation changes in circumstances provides an alternative remedy.119 
Courts also face another scenario where prepetition payments to a creditor 
will not be paid during the entire length of the repayment plan. While the 
scenario discussed above involves the termination of the contractual repayment 
term, debtors may also terminate payments during a chapter 13 bankruptcy by 
choosing to surrender collateral to the secured creditor. Prior to the Lanning 
and Ransom decisions, courts frequently held that debtors could deduct a 
payment to a secured creditor to reduce projected disposable income even if 
the creditor received nothing in the chapter 13 plan.120 The Sixth Circuit Court 
 
 117 See Brief of National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011) (No. 09-907), 2010 WL 2662747 at *25–
26; Oral Argument at 10:06, Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011) (No. 09-907), at 35–37, 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/09-907.pdf (discussion 
between Justice Elena Kagan and attorney Deanne E. Maynard for Respondent); David M. Serafin, 
Ramifications of U.S. Supreme Court’s Ransom Decision for Colorado Bankruptcy Filers, 
DAVIDSERAFINLAW.COM (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.davidserafinlaw.com/lawyer-attorney-1711958.html 
(arguing that most debtors who have paid for a car in full prepetition will need to purchase a new car during 
five-year plan, and those that are most harmed by the Ransom decision). 
 118 Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2478 (requiring substantial certainty of changes as of confirmation of plan). 
 119 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1) (2006). 
 120 See, e.g., Lynch v. Haenke (In re Lynch), 395 B.R. 346 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (allowing debtor deduction 
for mortgage payments despite intent to surrender property); In re Burbank, 401 B.R. 67 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2009) 
(same); In re Marshall, 407 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) (allowing debtor full deduction for mortgage 
payments despite intent to strip junior mortgage lien); In re Anderson, 383 B.R. 699, 706 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
2008), abrogated by Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2478, as recognized in In re McDonald, 437 B.R. 278, 291 n.14 
(S.D. Ohio 2010) (allowing the deduction despite surrender of property is the majority rule); In re Hayes, 376 
B.R. 55 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (allowing the debtor to use a deduction for surrendered property because 
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of Appeals and the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, each relying on 
Lanning, held that the virtual certainty that the debtor would not make 
mortgage payments after surrendering real property to the mortgage holder 
meant that the debtor could exclude such payments to reduce projected 
disposable income.121 Since the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Ransom,122 
which the Supreme Court subsequently affirmed, at least one bankruptcy court 
has denied mortgage expense deductions from projected disposable income for 
surrendered property.123 Though this scenario differs from the termination of 
car payment cases because the debtor rids himself or herself of the expense at 
confirmation of the plan rather than at completion of the debt obligation, 
Lanning’s focus on the change from the debtor’s prepetition reality and 
postpetition reality suggests that debtors whose expenses change during the 
plan period should likewise reduce their projected disposable income to reflect 
that change.124 
2. Debtors Whose Standard Allowances Exceed Actual Expenses 
The Ransom Court also expressly declined to address the issue of how to 
calculate a payment that falls below the allowance provided by the IRS 
standards: 
The parties and the Solicitor General as amicus curiae dispute the 
proper deduction for a debtor who has expenses that are lower than 
the amounts listed in the Local Standards. Ransom argues that a 
debtor may claim the specified expense amount in full regardless of 
his out-of-pocket costs. . . . The Government concurs with this view, 
provided (as we require) that a debtor has some expense relating to 
the deduction. . . . FIA, relying on the IRS’s practice, contends to the 
 
payments to the creditor were not due until discharge of debt). But see Hildebrand v. Thomas (In re Thomas), 
395 B.R. 914 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008) (disallowing deduction for surrendered property); In re Long, 390 B.R. 
581, 589–90 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2008) (denying debtor deduction for car payments once property was 
surrendered); In re Holmes, 395 B.R. 149 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008) (disallowing deduction for lien-stripped 
property). 
 121 Darrohn v. Hildebrand (In re Darrohn), 615 F.3d 470, 476–77 (6th Cir. 2010); Zeman v. Liehr (In re 
Liehr), 439 B.R. 179, 184–86 (10th Cir. B.A.P. 2010); see also In re Blaies, 436 B.R. 35 (E.D. Mich. 2010) 
(denying debtor’s use of mortgage expenses for a second lien stripping under a chapter 13 plan); DeHart v. 
Smith (In re Smith), 438 B.R. 69 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2010) (same); In re Grant, 423 B.R. 320 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 
2010) (same). 
 122 Ransom v. MBNA, Am. Bank, N.A. (In re Ransom), 577 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. 
Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 723. 
 123 In re Amidon, 423 B.R. 546 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2010). 
 124 See, e.g., Baud v. Carroll, 634 F.2d 327, 349 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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contrary that a debtor may claim only his actual expenditures in this 
circumstance. . . . We decline to resolve this issue. Because Ransom 
incurs no ownership expense at all, the car-ownership allowance is 
not applicable to him in the first instance. Ransom is therefore not 
entitled to a deduction under either approach.125 
Prior to Lanning, the majority of courts considering what to do when a debtor’s 
actual expense fell below the standard allowance used the “allowance 
approach,”126 which allowed the debtor to deduct the full amount of the 
expense in calculating projected disposable income.127 Both the trustee and 
debtor supported such an interpretation of the Code. However, a minority of 
courts used the alternative “cap” approach,128 allowing the debtor to use the 
lesser of either the allowance or the actual amount of the debtor’s applicable 
expense in that category.129 Taking the Ransom and Lanning cases together, a 
few clear principles emerge: 
1. The starting point for determining projected disposable income 
involves the calculation of current monthly income based on the six-
months preceding the petition date, reduced by the expenses permitted 
under § 707(b). 
2. A debtor who does not incur any expense in a category may not deduct 
that expense. 
3. Known or virtually certain changes from the calculation of disposable 
income under § 707(b) may be accounted for in projecting the 
disposable income for the term of the plan.130 
While Ransom did not address the issue, the allowance approach that permits a 
debtor to take the full standard deduction for the length of the plan highlights 
 
 125 Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 727 n.8. 
 126 See supra Part III.C. 
 127 HILLMAN & CROUCH, supra note 107, § 13:3.4; see, e.g., Musselman v. eCast Settlement Corp., 394 
B.R. 801 (E.D.N.C. 2008); In re Pearl, 394 B.R. 309 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Egbert, 384 B.R. 818 
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2008); In re Phillips, 382 B.R. 153 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008); In re Briscoe, 374 B.R. 1 
(Bankr. D.D.C. 2007); In re Morgan, 374 B.R. 353 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007); In re Chamberlain, 369 B.R. 519 
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007); In re Barrett, 371 B.R. 855 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2007); In re Swan, 368 B.R. 12 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. 2007); In re Haley, 354 B.R. 340 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2006). 
 128 See supra Part III.D 
 129 In re Rezentes, 368 B.R. 55 (Bankr. D. Haw. 2007); see also In re Egbert, 384 B.R. 818, 828 (Bankr. 
E.D. Ark. 2008) (citing only In re Rezentes for the cap approach, but noting that at least five other courts have 
used the allowance approach). 
 130 See supra Part II.A. 
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potential tension between the Lanning and Ransom cases.131 The conflict arises 
because Lanning allows modification of the formulaic disposable income 
calculation to account for “virtually certain” changes to the debtor’s 
calculation. 
The Lanning Court did not specifically address the definition of the term 
“changes,” and courts differ as to whether to limit Lanning to changes in the 
debtor’s financial situation from prepetition to postpetition, or to include 
changes that occur during the postpetition repayment period.132 Changes 
interpreted broadly could include any situation in which the debtor’s formulaic 
 
 131 While the Lanning and Ransom decisions at first glance seem to agree, because both reject a purely 
formulaic approach for calculating projected disposable income, there is potential inconsistency between the 
decisions: 
the Lanning Court’s rejection of the inference drawn by mechanical approach proponents, that 
Congress sought to eliminate judicial discretion in the determination of a debtor’s projected 
disposable income, could produce outcomes at odds with Ransom. An exercise of discretion 
could arguably permit a bankruptcy court to allow an expense not incurred by a debtor if she 
could show a known or virtually certain, substantial change to her expenses, such as, e.g., a 
virtually certain need, during the plan period, to replace a high mileage, aging 
vehicle. . . . Lanning afforded the Court the opportunity to avoid the Scylla and Charybdis of 
either forcing a debtor to propose an unfeasible plan or permitting her to deny easily affordable 
repayments to creditors. In contrast, Ransom forced the Court to make a choice: either prohibit a 
“fictitious expense” that the debtor does not pay or deny creditors repayment on the strength of 
statutory language that eschews a debtor’s financial reality. It chose the former. 
Gilbert B. Weisman & William A. McNeal, Projected Disposable Income Captures the Attention of the 
Supreme Court—Twice!, 4 NORTON BANKR. L. ADV. 1, Apr. 2011, at text accompanying notes 107–11, 
available at Westlaw, 2011 NO. 4 NRTN-BLA 1. 
 132 The Scott court applied changes narrowly, only considering modifications from prepetition to 
postpetition expenditures. In re Scott, 457 B.R. 740, 748 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2011). In Miranda, the court used 
the fact that the debtor received bonuses regularly—clearly not a change from pre- to post-petition—to 
establish the need to include the additional income. In re Miranda, 449 B.R. 182, 185, 190, 196 (Bankr. D.P.R. 
2011). Similarly, debtors who happen to file a bankruptcy petition shortly after receiving an annual bonus 
might have an artificially high income, while debtors who happen to file a bankruptcy petition shortly before 
receiving an annual bonus might have an artificially low income. But the debtor’s pre- and postpetition 
situation has not changed substantially in that the debtor holds the same position at the same pay scale. In re 
Reed, 454 B.R. 790, 798 (Bankr. D. Oregon 2011) (“Because there is no change in [debtor’s] income, but only 
different calculations depending on what period of time is used, the trustee has not established a known or 
virtually certain change in [debtor’s] income that should be used to adjust debtors' disposable income 
calculation”). Even Lanning did not involve a change for the debtor, but instead a reflection of the problem 
that arises as a result of a formulaic calculation of income. The debtor in Lanning did not change jobs, and her 
regular income did not change between pre- to postpetition. Rather, the calculated current monthly income 
failed to accurately reflect the income that she regularly received because it happened to include a one-time 
payment. Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2470 (2010). However, because the debtor’s one-time 
payment would clearly not recur in the future, the Lanning scenario presents more of a change than the 
Miranda scenario. See supra text accompanying notes 83–86. 
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calculation of disposable income does not reflect reality postpetition, or 
interpreted narrowly, could require that a debtor’s income or expenses 
postpetition differ in any way from income or expenses prepetition. For 
example, if a debtor earns an annual bonus of $10,000 in the six months 
prepetition, a narrow construction of changes would not allow the debtor to 
reduce the formulaic calculation of current monthly income because nothing 
would change for the debtor postpetition—the debtor received a salary plus 
$10,000 annual bonus prepetition and a salary plus $10,000 annual bonus 
postpetition. Under a broad construction of changes, the debtor could reduce 
current monthly income to reflect the reality that the debtor does not actually 
receive a $10,000 bonus every six months as the calculation suggests. 
3. Combining the Allowance and Cap Approaches with Lanning’s Change 
Analysis 
On the expense side of the projected disposable income equation, four 
possibilities exist for combining the allowance versus cap approach and the 
narrow versus broad interpretations of change: 
1. the allowance-approach-plus-broad-interpretation combination: the 
debtor may take the full deduction for standard allowances and change 
is interpreted broadly to consider any deviation from the debtor’s 
financial reality in calculating projected disposable income; 
2. the allowance-approach-plus-narrow-interpretation combination: the 
debtor may take the full deduction for standard allowances and change 
is interpreted narrowly to consider only changes in debtor’s postpetition 
financial reality from debtor’s prepetition situation in calculating 
projected disposable income; 
3. the cap-approach-plus-broad-interpretation combination: the debtor 
may use the lesser of the amount actually used in expenses or the 
standard allowance and change is interpreted broadly to consider any 
deviation from the debtor’s financial reality in calculating projected 
disposable income; or 
4. the cap-approach-plus-narrow-interpretation combination: the debtor 
may use the lesser of the amount actually used in expenses or the 
standard allowance, and change is interpreted narrowly to consider only 
changes in debtor’s postpetition financial reality from debtor’s 
prepetition situation in calculating projected disposable income. 
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The allowance-approach-plus-broad-interpretation fails in its application 
because, if the debtor is permitted to take the full deduction under the 
allowance approach, the fact that the debtor does not, in reality, need the full 
deduction does not matter. For example, if a debtor’s automobile expense 
allowance is $200 per month, but she only expends $180 per month, the broad 
interpretation of change would recognize that the debtor’s use does not match 
the allowance, but the allowance approach ignores that very fact. 
The allowance plus-narrow-interpretation fares only slightly better than the 
allowance approach plus broad interpretation, but still creates a potential 
difficulty. On the one hand, the approach suggests that changes to the debtor’s 
financial situation do not matter because the calculation of disposable income 
never considered the debtor’s financial situation in the first place. 
Alternatively, taken to the extreme, the allowance-approach-plus-narrow-
interpretation combination could mean that a debtor who historically incurred 
$100 in monthly car expenses, but whose monthly allowance totaled $500, 
could take the entire $500 allowance for the life of the plan. However, if the 
debtor’s monthly car expenses doubled postpetition, the change in debtor’s 
circumstances would reduce the amount that the debtor could deduct to $200 
per month. Such an “anomaly”133 but it creates an odd result that borders upon 
absurdity.134 While Lanning did not expressly consider how changed expenses 
would modify projected disposable income, an allowance approach would 
necessarily defeat Lanning’s holding allowing virtually certain changes to 
modify projected disposable income as to standard deductions regardless of 
how courts interpret the term “change.” 
Conversely, either of the cap approaches to defining “change” works under 
Lanning because the cap approach starts with the debtor’s actual financial 
situation. The only question becomes how to define “change” to modify that 
calculation—the same question that arises on the income side of the projected 
 
 133 See supra text accompanying notes 105–07 (discussing Ransom’s description, in dicta, of the 
anomaly). 
 134 And, while the cap approach might prevent some unusual results, the Ransom dicta noted that a 
“bright-line rule” might have some unfortunate consequences, such as allowing a debtor with just a few car 
payments to use the deduction throughout the bankruptcy case. Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 
716, 729 (2011). If the Ransom Court had favored a broad interpretation of change and thus permitted 
modifications of the standard allowances to reflect actual expenses, no such consequences would have existed 
because the debtor’s actual use would limit the hypothetical debtor’s car payment allowance. 
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disposable income equation.135 Use of the cap approach also supports use of 
the step-up doctrine.136 The step-up doctrine suggests that when a debtor’s 
actual expense terminates, the debtor must increase the disposable income 
attributable to the repayment of creditors. At the time that an expense 
terminates, there is a cognizable postpetition change in the debtor’s expenses 
that causes the expense to be zero—certainly less than the allowance amount. 
As a result, the cap approach also requires application of the step-up doctrine 
when the debtor no longer pays a certain expense. 
The cap approach meets the stated purposes of BAPCPA137 and avoids the 
odd result of capping expenses for some debtors who do not use the full 
allowance because of a postpetition change in circumstances, but allows the 
full expense for other debtors whose circumstances do not change postpetition. 
However, Lanning may apply only to changes that occur prepetition. For 
calculating current monthly income, the debtor’s actual income serves as the 
starting point. Likewise, for those expenses that are not within the 
allowances,138 the debtor’s incurring of the expense becomes the starting point. 
The cap approach meets the stated purposes of BAPCPA139 and avoids the odd 
result of capping expenses for some but not all debtors who do not use the full 
allowance in the event of narrowly defined changed circumstances. However, 
Lanning may apply only to changes that occur prepetition. For calculating 
current monthly income, the debtor’s actual income serves as the starting point. 
Likewise, for those expenses that are not within the allowances140 Lanning 
supports this interpretation, noting that “projected”—the term at the heart of 
the opinion—recognizes that historical calculations might not repeat 
themselves.141 When those calculations focus not on the debtor’s historical 
income but upon IRS standards, no concern exists regarding whether the 
debtor’s historical numbers remain unchanged. Lanning also focused on the 
 
 135 Under either a narrow or broad interpretation of the term “changes,” a debtor who incurs an actual 
expense that equals or exceeds the standard deduction, but whose expense will terminate during the period of 
the repayment plan could be required to step up the amount of disposable income once the expense 
disappeared. Not only does the continued deduction of the no longer applicable expense fail to reflect the 
debtor’s true situation, but it also represents a difference from the debtor’s prepetition situation. 
 136 See supra Part III.F.1. 
 137 See Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 725; Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2472–74. 
 138 For example, a debtor must actually incur private school tuition expenses to deduct that expense. 11 
U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(IV) (2006). 
 139 See Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 725; Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2472–74. 
 140 For example, a debtor must actually incur private school tuition expenses to deduct that expense. 11 
U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(IV). 
 141 Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2467. 
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use of the formulaic calculation as simply a starting point and specifically 
noted that at least some expenses could be modified to reflect a more realistic 
situation.142 
Thus, the Lanning decision provides little, and potentially conflicting, 
guidance as to whether it applies to standard deductions; the Ransom 
decision’s statement regarding the allowance approach is mere dicta and not 
binding. This leaves both the statutes and the two Supreme Court cases 
interpreting the statutes lending little guidance in the ultimate resolution on 
whether the cap or allowance approach applies for a debtor with an actual 
expense of less than the IRS standard allowance. 
G. BAPCPA’s Policy of Creditor Protection 
The policy considerations of both the Code and BAPCPA weigh in favor of 
limiting the debtor’s use of the standard allowance to the actual amounts 
needed and to the actual time period needed by the debtor.143 The Ransom 
Court highlighted one clear policy of BAPCPA—maximization of creditor 
recovery—by determining that a debtor may not deduct any expense in a 
standard deduction category if the debtor does not actually incur an expense. 
Some commentators have suggested that the Court’s emphasis on maximizing 
recovery for creditors signifies that, given the opportunity, the Supreme Court 
would choose the cap approach in dealing with under utilization of standard 
allowances.144 Limiting deductions to the lesser of actual or standard expenses 
 
 142 Id. at 2475. 
 143 Arguably, some debtors may need a new car in order to promote the fresh start. However, a debtor 
with a paid-in-full car needs a new car for the fresh start more than a debtor still making car payments when 
bankruptcy begins because the latter debtor likely owns a newer car than the former debtor. See supra note 117 
and accompanying text. If the Ransom Court accepted that denial of the automobile expense deduction did not 
unduly impede the debtor’s fresh start when the debtor completed car ownership payments before filing for 
bankruptcy protection, it should not unduly impede the debtor’s fresh start to have the deduction terminate 
when the expense terminates postpetition. 
 144 W. HOMER DRAKE ET AL., CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 9F:34, 1258 (2011-2 ed., 2011) 
(“Although the Ransom Court expressly declined to decide whether the ‘allowance with payment’ or ‘cap’ 
interpretations governs when the debtor’s payment is lower than the amount the Transportation Standard 
permits, its rationale provides support for adoption of the ‘cap’ approach, which limits the deduction to the 
actual amount of the debtor’s payment.”) (footnote omitted); Anne Benton Hucker, Note, Do I Own This Car?: 
The Supreme Court Creates a Standard for BAPCPA Car Ownership, 76 MO. L. REV. 1239, 1256 (2011) 
(concluding that courts will likely use Ransom and the IRS standards to limit debtors to actual use, while 
arguing that BAPCPA’s poor drafting led to an incorrect decision). But see Davis-Smith, supra note 39, at text 
accompanying notes 52–57 (“the fact that the [Ransom] Court decided a case concerning the details of the 
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and requiring debtors to increase projected disposable income upon completion 
of expense payments would further the policy of maximizing creditor recovery 
because it would necessarily increase the disposable income available for the 
plan. 
However, while these approaches serve to maximize creditor recovery, 
BAPCPA and the remainder of the Code offer countervailing policies that 
favor a debtor’s use of the full standard allowance for the entire term of the 
bankruptcy plan, regardless of actual need. In particular, BAPCPA serves to 
minimize judicial discretion and provide certainty for both creditors and the 
debtor in determining the assets that will be available for distribution to 
creditors.145 To some extent, these approaches involve the discretion of the 
court, albeit only to the extent that a trustee or creditor provides evidence that 
the debtor actually spends less than the allowance in the standards or that the 
debtor will not need the allowance for the life of the plan. But these approaches 
have only a minimal effect on the amount of judicial discretion—certainly no 
more than the ability to modify income that the Supreme Court allowed in 
Lanning. The Code also furthers the policy of protecting the debtor’s fresh 
start. Neither the cap approach nor the step-up approach would harm the 
debtor’s fresh start because neither prevents the debtor from taking the expense 
needed to effectuate that fresh start. If the debtor actually spends only $300, 
the cap approach will reduce the expense to $300, but that amount should 
suffice to further the debtor’s fresh start. Likewise, if the debtor’s actual 
expense ends one year into the plan, the step-up approach gives the debtor the 
benefit of having the allowance when the debtor actually needs it. In fact, the 
most significant harm to the fresh start would come to the debtor whose actual 
expenses exceed the allowance—but that limitation on the fresh start applies 
under any approach.146 For example, if the debtor incurs an $800 per month 
 
statutory ‘disposable income’ formula suggests that the Court did not view Lanning as having replaced the 
statutory formula with an actual-ability-to-pay test.”). 
 145 Musselman v. eCast Settlement Corp., 394 B.R. 801, 812 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (“in enacting BAPCPA, 
Congress had more than one policy goal in mind. Beyond ensuring greater payouts by Chapter 13 debtors to 
their creditors, Congress, in its amendments to § 1325(b), also sought to impose objective standards on 
Chapter 13 determinations, thereby removing a degree of judicial flexibility in bankruptcy proceedings”). 
 146 Courts uniformly forbid the debtor from including expenses in excess of the allowance amounts. See In 
re Thiel, 446 B.R. 434 (D. Idaho 2011) (denying chapter 13 debtors’ request to exceed allowed transportation 
expenses, and rejecting argument that Lanning and Ransom allow such modification); In re Prestwood, 451 
B.R. 180 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2011) (denying chapter 13 debtors’ request to exceed allowed expenses). Even 
though the Lanning Court refers to modifications to projected disposable income based upon “virtually certain 
information about the debtor’s future income or expenses.” Frost, supra note 47, at text accompanying note 31 
(quoting Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2475) (emphasis added). Thus, the cap approach lacks consistency because it 
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automobile ownership expense, but a standard allowance of only $500, all 
approaches limit the debtor to the $500 expense in calculating projected 
disposable income. Thus, neither the cap nor the step-up approaches diminish 
the debtor’s ability to enjoy a fresh start. 
CONCLUSION: RECONCILING STATUTORY LANGUAGE, PRECEDENT, AND 
POLICY 
Reconciling statutory interpretation, precedent, and policy in determining a 
debtor’s ability to deduct expenses in calculating projected disposable income 
presents difficulties to bankruptcy courts. An approach that limits the debtor’s 
use of standard allowances to the debtor’s actual need and terminates the use of 
standard allowances upon full payment of relevant debt furthers the policy 
objective of maximizing creditor recovery. The cap and step-up approaches 
follow Lanning by allowing modifications of expenses when the disposable 
income formula fails to reflect the debtor’s postpetition reality. The allowance 
approach follows the canons of statutory construction and Ransom’s 
interpretation of the term “applicable.” The allowance approach allows 
modifications to the disposable income formula only in cases with an actual 
change to the debtor’s circumstances pre- and postpetition that serve as the 
basis for the calculation of projected disposable income 
Ultimately, the statutory language and Supreme Court precedents fail to 
provide clear guidance on the “cap” versus “allowance” approach for debtors 
who use less than the standard allowance amounts. Lanning and Ransom do 
suggest that the step-up approach should apply when payments terminate 
during the plan period. For the cap versus allowance approach debate, policy 
favors the cap approach because it maximizes recovery for the creditors 
without unduly impacting the debtor’s fresh start. Together, the cap and step-
up approaches create an “actual use” approach that furthers policy and 
reconciles the Supreme Court precedents regarding the calculation of projected 
disposable income. 
 
allows a creditor or trustee to decrease deductions to reflect reality, but fails to allow the debtor to increase 
deductions to reflect reality. 
